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11. Introduction
When economists talk about equality, they typically have equality of
outcomes, like welfare or income in mind. However such a view of equality is not
entirely satisfactory and theories of equality of opportunity have been developed and
proposed as an alternative1. To highlight the distinction between equality of outcome
and equality of opportunity, consider two young adults, David and Dick.  They are
identical twins who grew up in the same family, went to the same high school and had
the same circle of friends.  After high school, they have to decide what to do next.
Their parents are sufficiently wealthy and open minded, so that David and Dick can
do anything that they want.   Both decide to go into auto mechanics.  David works
hard, while Dick is lazy.  As a consequence, David becomes very rich, while Dick
remains poor.  Assuming that egalitarians care for people’s incomes, should this
inequality of income be a source of concern?  For egalitarians that believe in equality
of outcome the answer is yes, for egalitarians that believe in equality of opportunity
the answer is no.  The reason is that both had the same set of opportunities.  David
decides to work hard, while Dick chooses to put in no effort.  Equality of opportunity
holds individuals accountable for their choices.
Next, consider two different young adults.  Charlene’s parents are rich, while
Christine’s parents are poor.  Both of them would like to become a surgeon.  The
training to become a doctor takes a lot of time, and Christine’s parents cannot afford
to send their daughter to college so she becomes a nurse instead.  They both work
equally hard in their chosen professions.  Surgeons have much higher lifetime
earnings than nurses.  Consequently, Charlene’s lifetime earnings will be much higher
2than Christine’s.  In this case, outcome egalitarians and opportunity egalitarians will
agree that this inequality is undesirable.
If we focus on equality of outcome then any inequality is undesirable. Equality
of opportunity, on the other hand, holds people responsible for some differences in
outcomes, like those that are the result of genuine choice, but not for others, like those
that result from social background, racial or sexual discrimination. The latter are
called non-responsibility characteristics.  This has one immediate consequence for the
informational requirements of the empirical analysis of inequality.  If we are
interested in inequality of income, we only need data on the distribution of incomes.
If attention is focused on inequality of opportunity for income these data will not
suffice.   We then have to identify and measure variables or characteristics for which
people are responsible, and variables for which they aren’t responsible, in order to
calculate an individual’s opportunity set.
In the next section we further examine the concept of equality of opportunity
by defining the opportunity sets of individuals conditional on characteristics for which
they are not responsible. In Section 3 we describe the nonparametric methodology we
use to estimate the opportunity sets of individuals while in Section 4 we use this
methodology to examine the intergenerational mobility between father’s income (non-
responsible characteristic, x) and son’s income (outcome, y). We conclude in Section
5.
2. Equality of Opportunity
The second example given in the introduction implicitly raises the issue of the
evaluation of opportunity sets.  Charlene has clearly superior opportunities:
Christine’s choice set is probably a subset of Charlene’s, but can we somehow
3quantify this difference?  The answer to this question is non-trivial, e.g., Sen (1985)2,
and many different answers have been given, see Bossert et al. (1999).  A related
issue focuses on redistribution among individuals. For instance, we may want to
compensate people for the influence of the non-responsibility characteristics, yet
preserve the influence of responsibility characteristics -see, e.g., Fleurbaey (1995c)
for a discussion that puts the issue of responsibility into a general egalitarian
perspective. In example one, all of the non-responsibility characteristics of David and
Dick are equal so we would want to hold Dick accountable for being lazy.  With
equality of opportunity, individuals cannot be held responsible for being born into a
poor family and so in example two, Christine should be compensated for this fact.3
Our paper provides a non-parametric procedure for estimating opportunity sets for
those interested in evaluating differences in these sets. With this approach, we can
also analyse the impact of responsibility and non-responsibility characteristics on
outcomes. Let the opportunity set of a person, Sx, be determined by a vector of non-
responsibility characteristics, x.  The elements of Sx are the relevant outcomes. A
person’s non-responsibility characteristics determine the opportunity set out of which
she can chose, while the responsibility characteristic determines which outcome she
chooses from that set. Different people that are of the same type may choose different
options out of their opportunity set, and therefore obtain a different relevant outcome,
z=y[p,x]. One can think of z as utility or lifetime income.  p represents the variable
that causes differences in the outcome for which we do not want to compensate.  p
can be thought of as a taste parameter inducing people to work harder.  We will
assume that p is a scalar.  The first branch of the literature referred to above tries to
order (distributions of) opportunity sets, Sx, the second branch of the literature
4imposes requirements on y[p,x].  To examine  either of these issues, we need to be
able to identify the opportunity sets.
The first step in doing this concerns the identification of p.  We will assume
that the distribution function of p is continuous4.  Roemer (1993, 1996, 1998)
proposes a procedure that can be motivated by the combination of two assumptions5:
SINC (Strictly Increasing): y[p,x] is a strictly increasing function of p.
This assumption is quite natural if a higher value for p is thought of as
inducing more effort.  Let Fz
*[z|x] and Fp*[p|x] denote the cumulative distribution
function of z conditional on x, and the cumulative distribution of p conditional on x,
respectively.  SINC implies that
Fz
*[y[p’,x]|x]=Fp*[p’|x] (1)
In words: an individual’s level of effort is smaller than the α-th percentile in
the distribution of the effort within his type if and only if his outcome is below the α-
th percentile in the distribution of outcome within his type.
IND (Independence): Fp
*[p’|x] is independent of x.
Again this assumption is quite acceptable since it is difficult to imagine in
what sense people could be held responsible for p if the independence axiom does not
hold6.
Together  (1) and IND imply7 Roemer’s identification axiom:
RIA (Roemer’s Identification Axiom): Fz
*[y[p’,x1]|x1] = Fz*[y[p’’,x2]|x2]
⇒p’=p’’
RIA says that, if two people of different types are at the same percentile of the
distribution of the outcome within their type, then they have the same value for p.  Let
π= Fz
*[z |x] denote the cumulative distribution of the outcome (z) given the level of
non-responsibility (x). Assume that this is a strictly increasing function of z. Fz
*-1[π|x]
5expresses the income level obtained by an individual of type x and who was at the
100*π-th percentile of the cumulative distribution of outcome within his type.
Looking at Fz
*-1[π|x] is, because of RIA, equivalent to looking at y[p,x].
Fz
*-1[π|x] visualises the dependence of the outcome on responsibility and non-
responsibility characteristics.  It allows us to draw income as a function of π∈[0,1] for
different values of x.  The opportunity set for a particular type x is given by the
outcomes someone of type x can obtain by varying his responsibility characteristic p
or π. Consequently, we find the opportunity set of individuals of type x as
( ) [ ]( ) [ ]{ }xFzRzS zx ππ 1* 1,0, −+ =×∈= (2)
where R+ is the set of non-negative real numbers.  If Fz[z|x] was known we
could depict the opportunity sets for different types of individuals, as suggested by
Fleurbaey, described in Bossert et al (1999) and found in Roemer (1998, p.75).
Visual inspection of these sets will provide some idea about the degree of inequality
of the opportunities offered to different types and the extent to which people who
have the same tastes or expended level of effort obtain different outcomes.8
In the literature it is usually assumed that society somehow determines the
elements of x.  It can be expected that x is a multi-dimensional variable including
things like race, sex, parental background and innate ability.  The data requirements
for the calculation of these conditional opportunity sets are vast.  Therefore we
illustrate the above framework in the context of intergenerational mobility9.  In this
context, z is the son’s income and x, the vector of non-responsibility characteristics, is
parental income. Conditioning only on father’s income might make the independence
assumption less plausible.  However, scholars often look at data on intergenerational
mobility as providing an indication of the extent of inequality of opportunity in
6society.  The above analysis makes explicit that such an interpretation can only be
maintained if some kind of independence assumption holds.
Roemer (1998) and Betts and Roemer (1998) propose to construct opportunity
sets by running a regression of π on the outcome variable.  That procedure has two
obvious disadvantages.  First, the approach is parametric so a functional form has to
be imposed.  Second, the procedure is only operational if the number of types is finite,
otherwise π cannot be identified. Alternatively it has been suggested that
intergenerational transition matrices can be used to obtain a rough approximation of
the opportunity sets open to children from different descent – see Van de gaer,
Schokkaert and Martinez (1998).  Transition matrices are non-parametric, but are
based on a discrete approximation of the conditional distribution.  Both parents’
incomes and children’s incomes have to be divided into classes, called bins.  As a
consequence, transition matrices are sensitive to the choice of bins.  As noted in Quah
(1996), this approach can distort dynamics when the underlying observations are not
discrete. To overcome these problems, we propose using kernel density estimation
techniques to estimate the entire conditional distribution of children’s income which
avoids the need for arbitrary discretization of the data.
3.   Bivariate Kernel Density Estimation
 Denoting father’s income by x and son’s income by z, the distribution of z
given x can be written as:
[ ] [ ][ ]xf
xzf
xzf
x
,
=
(3)
where fx[x] is the marginal distribution of father’s income and f[z,x] is the joint
distribution of z and x . To estimate this distribution we replace both the numerator
and denominator of this expression with non-parametric estimates. The marginal
7distribution of father’s income is estimated using adaptive kernel density techniques
for univariate distributions. That is:
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where hx is the bandwidth for father’s income and K[.] is the kernel
10. The subscript A
on the estimator indicates that the adaptive procedure is used.
The joint distribution of fathers' and sons' income (the numerator of (3)) is
estimated as
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The adaptive kernel estimator adjusts the window width so that the window is
narrower where the density is high and wider where the density is low, thus retaining
detail where data are plentiful and reducing noise where data are sparse.
The local window factors used are given by:
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where [ ]xzf k ,ˆ  is the fixed window kernel estimate of  f[z,x] and 
~
gf is the geometric
mean of [ ]xzf k ,ˆ . Implementation of this method thus involves a two-step estimation
strategy (see Silverman (1986) and Fox and Long (1990)). First [ ]xzf k ,ˆ  is estimated
using a fixed window width. This initial window width was calculated using Scott’s
optimal bandwidth for the bivariate normal density (Scott (1991), page 152)11. Next
this density is used to calculate the weights involved in constructing the final density
estimates in equations (4) and (5). We follow Trede (1998) in assuming that the
8kernel is multiplicative.  This simplifies the expression for the cumulative conditional
distribution.  However, as noted by Trede, more general specifications are possible.12
The conditional distribution is estimated by replacing the terms in equation (3)
with our estimates derived from (6) and (4)13.  One can think of this density as
providing an estimate of the transition matrix as the number of cells in the matrix
tends to infinity. In doing so the kernel approach avoids the arbitrary discretization
inherent in traditional transition matrix estimation.
In much of our analysis we will be interested in the cumulative distribution of
son’s income conditional on fathers income. Extending the approach discussed above
we estimate this directly as
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where G(z)= ∫
∞−
z
dttK )( is the cdf of the kernel function. The opportunity set for
children of parents with income level xi can then be estimated as
( ) [ ]( ) [ ]{ }izAx xFzRzS i ππ 1*ˆ 1,0,ˆ −+ =×∈= (8)
4. Empirical Results
As an illustration of the methodology discussed in sections 2 and 3, we now
compute and estimate the sets 
ix
S  in the context of intergenerational mobility. In part
a) we begin by deriving the opportunity sets for the case where fathers' and sons'
incomes are known to be joint lognormally distributed. In part b) we create an
artificial data set by drawing observations from a joint lognormal distribution. We use
9these observations to estimate the opportunity sets using the methodology developed
in section 3. We then compare our estimates to the true opportunity sets derived in
part a). Finally in part c) we apply our procedure to actual data on father and son’s
income taken from the National Longitudinal Surveys.
a) Opportunity Sets when Incomes are Jointly Lognormally Distributed
To visualise opportunity sets we must first specify a distribution. In this sub-
section we assume that the incomes of sons and fathers are jointly lognormally
distributed.14 Once this distribution is specified we can find (numerically) the
distribution of z (sons’ incomes) given x (father’s income). To derive the opportunity
sets we first fix a value for father’s income. Conditional on this value we plot son’s
income against the percentile points of the conditional distribution. Examples of these
opportunity sets are given in Figure 1, where the y-axis measures the son’s income
relative to the mean of son’s incomes and the x-axis represents the percentile points of
the conditional distribution.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Panel (a) shows the opportunity sets when incomes are not correlated.  Since
the distribution of son’s income conditional on father’s income does not depend on x,
the opportunity sets are the same for all levels of father’s income. With this
specification there is no inequality of opportunity. To obtain average income, one has
to have a level of effort equal to the 60th percentile in the effort distribution,
irrespective of father’s income.
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Panel (b) shows the opportunity sets when incomes are correlated, with the
correlation equal to .5.  In this case a son’s opportunities will depend on the level of
his father’s income and so the opportunity sets will differ. We plot 3 such opportunity
sets corresponding to ‘poor’, ‘average’ and ‘rich’ fathers. For the purpose of drawing
these graphs a poor father is defined as the individual at the 25th percentile of the
father’s income distribution. Average income is defined to be the median of the
father’s distribution and rich fathers are defined to be those at the 75th percentile of
the distribution. It is clearly advantageous to have a rich father.  Given a particular
amount of effort, a son whose father is rich always has a higher level of income than
one whose father is poor. The underlying income differences can be quite substantial.
If you work at a median level of effort and your father was rich, your income will be
40 per cent higher than the level of income obtained by someone who put in the same
amount of effort, but who was unfortunate to have a poor father. To obtain the
average level of income, sons of poor fathers have to work much harder than those
with rich fathers. Such differences are indicative of the existence of a substantial
amount of inequality of opportunity.
b) Nonparametric Estimation of Opportunity Sets with Simulated Lognormal Data
Non-parametric estimators are traditionally data intensive, see, e.g., Scott
(1992). However in most studies of intergenerational mobility the number of
observations are quite small.15  We generate an artificial data set, with 300
observations from a joint lognormal distribution and parameters equal to those used in
deriving Figure 1b). The estimated opportunity sets from these data along with the
true sets are given in Figure 2.16 The solid line represents the true opportunity set
11
while the dashed line represents the estimated set using the nonparametric method
described in Section 3 above.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Figure 2 suggests that even with small samples our estimator is capable of
providing estimated opportunity sets, which are similar to those generating the data.
c) Intergenerational Mobility: NLS Data
 This section of the paper illustrates our approach by applying it to an analysis
of intergenerational mobility in the U.S. Concerns about the intergenerational
transmission of well-being arise from the belief that such a process poses a significant
barrier to achieving equality of opportunity. However the studies examining
intergenerational mobility to date (for example Becker and Tomes (1979), Solon
(1992) and Zimmerman  (1992)) have tended to emphasize the correlation between
father and son’s income. Such an analysis is useful in that it determines the extent to
which children of poor families are themselves poor. However, as discussed in the
earlier sections, knowing only the correlation between incomes is not sufficient to
examine equality of opportunity. To do this we must estimate the opportunity sets
facing individuals from different parental backgrounds. We do this by estimating
equation (8) using data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS).
The NLS data contain information on four cohorts of individuals, each
consisting of approximately 5,000 members. These individuals were initially surveyed
in 1966 and then surveyed repeatedly throughout the 1970’s and early 1980’s. The
sampling design used by the Census Bureau made it possible for any given NLS
household to include respondents in more than one of the cohorts. This allows us to
12
match some children from the young cohorts with information obtained on their
parents in the older cohort surveys. In total 1,039 older men resided with a son who
was a respondent in the young men’s cohort.  When more than one match was
possible we follow Zimmerman (1992) and use the match involving the eldest son.
We are left with 876 father-son pairs from the “mature men” and “young men”
cohorts using data through 1981.
In order to obtain a more reliable measure of permanent income for fathers, we
average fathers’ income over the years 1965, 1966 and 1968. Furthermore, only
observations for which both the father and son were fully employed were retained in
the sample.17 To measure income we use data on wages and salaries expressed in
1981 prices using the CPIU historical index. When individuals with missing wage
data were excluded from the sample we were left with a sample of 204. Summary
statistics for this sample are provided in Table 1.18
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
The first step in implementing our approach is to estimate the density of son’s
income conditional on father’s income. To make our results transparent we express
both incomes relative to their respective means. The estimated conditional densities
are given in figure 3, while the contours of these densities are given in figure 4.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
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The contours in figure 4 highlight the positive relationship between fathers'
and sons' incomes. To the extent that son’s income is independent of father’s income
we would expect the contours of the conditional density to be horizontal lines.
However, the estimated contours are clearly upward sloping, indicating a positive
relationship between fathers' and sons' incomes. 19  This is even more apparent when
we restrict attention to fathers with less than twice the mean income.20
There is some evidence that the peaks at the lower end of the distribution are
higher than any other parts of the distribution, which would indicate less mobility
from lower income ranges. However, given the small sample sizes we should exercise
caution in interpreting small differences in the estimated density.
While this analysis complements the traditional measures of intergenerational
mobility the goal in our paper is to use these estimates to visualise the opportunity
sets facing individuals from different parental backgrounds.21 These are presented in
Figure 5.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
As before we present the opportunity sets for children from poor, average and
rich families. Looking at income differences among children with the same parental
background shows the impact of variations in characteristics for which children may
be held responsible (example effort). Thus we see that even among poor fathers
children who exert substantial effort can wind up with income levels greater than the
overall average. Fixing the percentile of the distribution on the other hand and
comparing outcomes across parental backgrounds provides information on the degree
of inequality of opportunity. For instance we see that among children who choose to
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exert little effort (say the 10th percentile of the respective distributions) children from
rich families can expect to earn 56% more ([.67/.43]-1) than children of poor families.
Alternatively one can see that in order to reach average income children from poor
families have to exert a level of effort which would place them at the 70th percentile
of their distribution. To reach the same level of income children from rich families
need only reach the 40th percentile of their distribution. These differences are
substantial and highlight the existence of substantial inequality of opportunity.
4. Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to develop a non-parametric procedure for
estimating the opportunity sets available to individuals of different types. While the
framework can be applied in any context, the application which we have focused on
concerns the impact of parental income on a child’s opportunities. Our results indicate
significant inequality of opportunity across family backgrounds. Children from poor
families can expect to do significantly worse than those from rich families, even
where both children exert the same level of responsibility.
The development of a procedure for estimating opportunity sets is the first step in
conducting an empirical analysis of equality of opportunity. In section 2, we briefly
surveyed the theoretical literature attempting to quantify differences in opportunity
sets. To date only crude estimates of opportunity sets have been available for this
analysis. Our approach provides a robust non-parametric means of estimating the
opportunity sets needed to carry this analysis further. An advantage of the non-
parametric approach developed in our paper is that it is amenable to the introduction
of controlling regressors and thus suited to estimating the counterfactual distributions
needed to study the effect of policy measures on the distribution of opportunities. We
15
are currently working on this issue. In our view the interaction of existing theoretical
literature on equality of opportunity with a non-parametric estimation strategy,
capable of carrying out counterfactual experiments, represents a significant
development in applying social choice analysis.
16
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for NLS Sample
Variable Name Mean (Std)
Fathers’ Log Earnings 1965 9.87 (.58)
Fathers’ Log Earnings 1966 9.91 (.52)
Fathers’ Log Earnings 1968 9.95 (.56)
Fathers’ Age 1966 49.7 (3.7)
Sons’ Log  Earnings 1981 9.90 (.50)
Sons’ Age 1981 32.73 (2.80)
Betaa .41 (.06)
N 204
a This is the regression estimate when sons’ income in 1981 is regressed on the three year average of
fathers’ income in 1981 dollars.
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Figure 1: Opportunity Sets of Sons when Fathers’ and Sons’ Incomes are Jointly
Lognormally Distributed
(a) The Opportunity Sets of Sons when Incomes are Uncorrelated
(b) The Opportunity Sets when the Correlation Coefficient=0.5
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Figure 2: True and Estimated Opportunity Sets when Fathers’ and Sons’ Incomes are
Jointly Lognormally Distributed.
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Figure 3: Estimated Conditional Densities of Sons’ Income given Fathers’ Income
using NLS data.
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Figure 4: Estimated Contours of the Conditional Distributions using NLS data.
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Figure 5: Estimated Opportunity Sets from the NLS data
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1 There is a vast philosophical literature about these issues. This literature is critically assessed in
Fleurbaey (1995d).  See also Roemer (1996) for an overview.
2 See Pattanaik and Xu (1990), Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu (1994), Kranich (1996), Gravel (1998) and
Ok and Kranich (1998) for related discussions.
3 Fleurbaey (1995a, b) shows that in general it is not possible to simultaneously compensate for the
influence of non-responsibility characteristics while preserving the influence of responsibility
characteristics.  Bossert (1995) comes to the same conclusion when income is the relevant outcome.
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996) and Iturbe- Ormaetxe (1997) discuss these issues further.  Roemer (1993)
and Van de gaer (1993) formulate a general objective to capture some of the above intuitions.  Bossert
et al (1999) discuss the links between the redistribution literature and the literature on social choice.
4 The framework can be easily adapted to deal with a discrete distribution of p.
5 See also Fleurbaey (1998, p.221).  He discusses how the procedure might work when some of the x
variables are observable.
6 The independence axiom is the formal representation of Roemer’s assumption of charity: “What I call
the assumption of charity says that, within any type, that distribution (referring to the distribution of
effort) would be the same, were we able to factor out the (different) circumstances which define types.”
(Roemer, 1998, p.15- the text in italics added for clarity)
7 Note that the procedure for drawing opportunity sets is valid under wider circumstances than SINC
and IND.  These are sufficient conditions only. Consider the case where y[p,x] is non-decreasing in p
for some types but not strictly increasing over the entire support of p. The conditional cumulative
distributions of outcomes for these types will then have a flat segment.  Hence their inverse does not
exist.  We can still draw the opportunity sets of these types, however.  The resulting opportunity set
will be horizontal over part of the support [0,1] of π.
8 Alternatively, the graph of Sx can be interpreted as a conditional Pen Parade, see, e.g., Pen (1980) or
Cowell (1995).
9 Van de gaer, Schokkaert and Martinez (1998) evaluate to what extent traditional measures of
intergenerational mobility conform to ideas of equality of opportunity.
10 Throughout our analysis a Gaussian kernel is assumed.
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11 We experimented with a range of bandwidths and obtained similar results to those presented in the
paper.
12 We have also carried out our estimation using more general bivariate normal kernels. The estimates
obtained using these kernels were similar to those presented in the paper.
13 A similar approach has been used by Quah (1996) to analyse income convergence across countries
and by Trede (1998) to examine income mobility over time for an individual.
14 We calibrate the distributions such that the mean of the log of sons’ and fathers’ incomes and the
standard deviation of the log of their incomes are equal to those in our NLS sample.
15 An exception to this is the work by Corak and Heisz (1999) who have approximately 400,000
observations in their data.
16 The computer programmes used to estimate these opportunity sets were written for Stata and are
available from the authors upon request.
17 We follow Zimmerman and define fully employed as those working on average 30 hours a week for
at least 30 weeks a year.
18 The correlation between the log of fathers and sons income for this data set is .41, which is similar to
those obtained by Zimmerman using average NLS data.
19 The fact that the slope of the contours are less than 1 is consistent with the pattern of regression
towards the mean found in previous studies.
20 In our sample, 96% of the observations fall in this range. The contours estimated outside that range
are determined with a low degree of precision.
21 We could also use our non-parametric estimates of the conditional density to test the linearity
assumption prevalent in previous work on intergenerational mobility.  We do not carry out such an
analysis in this paper, choosing instead to concentrate on estimating the opportunity sets. For a related
discussion on non-linearities in the intergenerational mobility process see Minicozzi (1997) and Corak
and Heisz (1999).
